




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Director of
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National Intelligence Daily

Monday
15 January 1979

State Dept. review completed

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
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
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SPECIAL ANALYSES

IRAN: Post-Shah Era




The Shah's appointment of a Regency Council this weekend sets the stage for his departure, which could come at any time. In the following assessment, we re-examine the position of key individuals and present several scenarios on how the situation in Iran may develop once the Shah leaves.



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The members of the Regency Council all represent the establishment and are thus unlikely to appeal to the opposition. Ayatollah Khomeini has already denounced the Council as illegal; National Front leader Sanjabi told US officials yesterday that he would not cooperate with the Council or any other entity that lacks Khomeini's approval.



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Prime Minister Bakhtiar's government will almost certainly be approved this week by the Senate, but the vote in the lower house of parliament, the Majlis, is in doubt.



Once the Shah leaves, we expect Bakhtiar will try to take credit for his departure. Some moderates in the opposition may try to give Bakhtiar breathing room out of fear of a military coup or a takeover by Khomeini, whom Bakhtiar has already invited to return.



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Bakhtiar faces formidable obstacles to holding onto power. He has no popular support and is regarded as a tool of the Shah by many in the opposition, including Sanjabi.



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Bakhtiar's best hope is to present himself as the only alternative to a military coup and chaos. He will argue that his government is essential to the transition to a new era. We doubt that he will be able to restore any semblance of order, however, unless he moves to bring into the government persons acceptable to Khomeini.

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Islamic Republic

Judging by his recent comments, Khomeini clearly believes he is close to achieving his goal of establishing an Islamic republic but is worried by the prospects of a military coup.

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Khomeini plans to return to Iran soon to guide the revolution. He will undoubtedly be greeted by mass adulation, and any effort to arrest him might trigger civil war.

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Military Coup

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The only major barrier between Khomeini and power is the military.

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
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If the senior officers arrest opposition leaders and are able to order key units to suppress demonstrations, they may succeed in the short term in restoring order in Tehran and some other cities. It is uncertain, however, whether the military can maintain order throughout the country and get the economy moving. Some members of the opposition may be cowed by a brutal crackdown, but Khomeini's hardcore followers are likely to turn to terrorism. 

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If the military moved to make some accommodation with the opposition and broke with the Shah, it might stand a chance of achieving a longer term political solution and of securing the cooperation of the majority of the labor force. Should the leaders of a coup insist on the retention of the Shah and fail to revive the economy, they risk a countercoup by officers more willing to make a deal with the opposition. 

Communist Activities

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The left probably cannot come to power without military support. We have no evidence of leftist sympathies in the military. Senior military officers as well as many prominent members of the opposition, including Khomeini, over the past few weeks have expressed deep concern about recent increased activity by radical leftists. 

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The pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party and other leftists probably hope that once the Shah departs the Bakhtiar government or its successors will allow free political activity and grant an amnesty that would permit the return of veteran party cadre now in exile in Eastern Europe. The Tudeh has shown in the past that it can take advantage of opportunities to make rapid strides and is doubtless exploiting the collapse of Iranian antissubversive agencies to reconstitute its organization. 

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

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Iran



The Senate today approved the Bakhtiar government by a vote of 38 to 2, according to a press report. One member abstained, and 19 members were not on hand. The lower house is expected to vote on the government tomorrow.




Jordan

The US Embassy in Amman reports that Armed Forces Commander in Chief Bin Shakir yesterday complained to Ambassador Veliotis about Washington's diversion to North Yemen of F-5Es initially intended for Jordan. He said that the diversion, coupled with other military supply problems over the past 18 months, have led Amman to believe that such actions were taken because of its attitude toward the Camp David agreements or because the US no longer desires a close military relationship with Jordan. Bin Shakir affirmed that Jordan wants that relationship maintained and noted that Amman last month turned down an Iraqi offer of 150 Soviet-built T-55 tanks. He told the Ambassador that King Hussein would also be discussing the diversion with him.



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
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